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“There Is Another Kingdom”:
On The Politics of Virtue
Tracey Rowland
University of Notre Dame Australia
Sydney and Fremantle, Australia

John Milbank’s and Adrian Pabst’s

The Politics of
Virtue could be described as the theo-political analogue to Rupert
Brooke’s The Soldier, Blake’s Jerusalem, and Sir Cecil Spring Rice’s I
Vow to Thee my Country all rolled into one. It pulls no punches and is
unashamedly in favor of aristocratic and monarchical forms of government, as well as the establishment of the Church of England. God,
Queen, and Country Anglicans who read it are likely to recall the
words of Simeon’s prayer upon the presentation of the Christ-child:
Nunc dimittis servum tuum, Domine, secundum verbum tuum in pace: Quia
viderunt oculi mei salutare tuum; Quod parasti ante faciem omnium populorum:
Lumen ad revelationem gentium, et gloriam plebis tuae Israel.
Another way to describe it would be a twenty-first-century Tory
manifesto or “Blue Labor” handbook. (The difference between the
British political classifications “Red Tory” and “Blue Labor” seems
to be more a matter of class identity than substantive policy preference). Whether one is an aristocrat with a strong sense of noblesse
oblige—that is, a Red or Turquoise Tory (turquoise is red combined
with green ecological interests)—or a person from a lowlier social
position who appreciates the value of an aristocratic element within
the social order—a Blue Labor type—the same substantive political
positions can be arrived at assuming a common Christian intellectual
foundation.
The Politics of Virtue is therefore in the genre of works that offer
a critique of liberal political theory from a Christian perspective. It
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shares something of the flavor of Alasdair MacIntyre’s many publications on the subject, especially the need to reclaim virtue and
unmask the confidence tricks and coercive character of liberal ideology. However, where MacIntyre and others have been criticized for
offering no alternative to the present liberal political order other than
building more monasteries, home schooling children, out-breeding
liberals, and praying for another St. Benedict or Joseph Ratzinger
(all reasonable strategies in my judgment), Milbank and Pabst have
dared to offer some concrete proposals about the structure of political institutions, as well as offering a robust defense of a Christian
commonwealth where both politics and economics are rooted in
virtuous practices.
While a wave of communitarian and specifically Catholic criticisms of liberalism began to be published in the 1980s, often in
response to John Rawls’s liberal classic A Theory of Justice (1971), at
a time when it seemed as though the end-of-history theorists and
a chorus of neoconservative Catholics might be right about the
triumph of liberalism, and hence the enthusiasm (especially among
American Catholics) to quickly baptise it, Milbank’s and Pabst’s
book comes after the outbreak of Islamic terrorism in 2001 and the
financial crisis of 2008. They note that both of these events “exposed
the limitations of the two liberalisms that have dominated Western
politics for the last half-century: the social-cultural liberalism of
the left since the 1960s and the economic-political liberalism of the
right since the 1980s.”1 The social-cultural liberalism of the left and
the economic-political liberalism of the right share the same starting position of a merely negative conception of liberty. A negative
conception of liberty is about “freedom from” something, rather than
“freedom for” something.
This negative liberty rests on two pillars: “a procedural, formalistic
conception of justice and an instrumental notion of reason.”2 The
combined result is that “individuals are proclaimed ‘autonomous’
when all the while they are subjected to the instrumental logic of
bureaucratic control and commercial exchange.”3 Worse yet, “the
scale of self-worth that the individual is encouraged to adopt is the

1

2
3

John Milbank and Adrian Pabst, The Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism and the
Human Future (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 1.
Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 18.
Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 19.
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very same scale by which she is subjected to mass manipulation.”4
The “double paradox at the heart of liberalism” is therefore the
“relentless privatisation of the public sphere and yet the ever-greater
invasion of the private sphere, coupled with an oppressive moralism masquerading as liberal impartiality and procedural fairness.”5
Milbank and Pabst strongly affirm the judgment of the Slovenian
philosopher Slavoj Žižek that negative liberty has led to “an explosion of legal and moral rules, an endless procession of legalization and
moralization, presented as the fight against all forms of discrimination.” Žižek rhetorically asks: “If there are no shared mores in place
to influence the law, just the bare fact of subjects ‘harassing’ other
subjects, then who—in the absence of such mores—will decide what
counts as harassment”? 6
Today, Milbank and Pabst conclude that “a new, rootless oligarchy
now practises a manipulative populism while holding in contempt
the genuine priorities of most people.” 7 The Milbank-Pabst solution is the blend of “two older and nobler traditions: a combination
of honourable, virtuous elites with greater popular participation; a
greater sense of cultural duty and hierarchy of value and honour,
alongside much more real equality and genuine creative freedom
in the economic and political realms.”8 Included here is a notion of
positive liberty as the search for objective truth and substantive goodness. The true and the good, understood as transcendental properties
of being, are a magnet for human desire, but they do not force it.
Unlike the operation of negative conceptions of liberty, they are not
stealthily coercive.
This recipe for a political order based on virtue harkens back to
the seventeenth-century division between Whigs and Tories and
champions the Tory line of vision. As Milbank and Pabst describe
the history:
The crucial lines of political division appear to have run, after
all, not between court and country, but between Whigs and

4
5
6

7
8

Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 19.
Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 19.
Slavoj Žižek, “Liberalism and its Discontents,” ABC Religion and Ethics, October 26, 2012 (http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2012/10/26/3619378.
htm), quoted by Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 20.
Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 2.
Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 1–2.
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Tories who were divided over the questions of the legitimacy of
the Hanovarian line and the primacy and independence of the
Church in the constitution. Just this latter stress rendered the
Tory version of commonwealth constitutional politics (remarkably instigated in part by none other than Charles I) more
genuinely hospitable towards diverse corporate privileges and
to the cultivation of genuinely virtuous roles—architectonically guided by “gentlemen”—within communities of purpose,
purposively pursuing a collectively shared end of national and
human excellence. By contrast, the Whigs tended to override
all inherited rights in the interests of property—demolishing
and removing villages, executing youthful deer-stealers and
legitimising the ownership even of people.9
As Samuel Johnson famously said, the devil was the first Whig!
Milbank and Pabst conclude from this that “at the heart of liberal
self-undoing lies the primacy of the economic and the political over
the social and thus the subordination of both social bonds and civic
ties to the abstract standards of law and contract.”10 This was also the
thesis of Karl Polanyi’s seminal work The Great Transformation (1944).
For a historical understanding of the triumph of the economic and
political over the social, Polanyi remains a leading authority.
In the United Kingdom, the effect of the Whig ascendency
included the replacement of the primacy of kingship as the source
of constitutional privileges in favor of a contractual view of power.
Virtue and honor got trumped by economic utility. Their rout was
aided and abetted by Scottish Calvinist soteriology. In France, a similar social trajectory was fostered by the Jansenist movement, which
is often described as Calvinism’s Catholic “twin.” According to this
genealogy, developed in the work of Jean Rohou and endorsed by
Milbank and Pabst, liberalism has been promoted by both secularizing hedonists and Christian puritans of both Protestant and Catholic
disposition. However, this is only part of the historical jigsaw puzzle.
Added to the unholy alliance of secularist hedonists and Christian
puritans, there is another ideological army, the Rousseauian romantics
or “Guardian/New York Times-reading, granola-eating left Liberals,”
as Milbank and Pabst describe them. These types invert the pessimism
of Thomas Hobbes (the idea that life in the state of nature is nasty,
9
10

Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 40.
Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 58.
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brutish, and short) and see life in the state of nature as basically good.
For these types, the “fall” occurs when one human being enters into
a society with other human beings. They are therefore distrustful of
what sociologists call “mediating institutions,” such as the family,
village communities, churches, and local cultural and philanthropic
associations. They prefer to locate all power in the state. These “new
left” types not only influence political and economic processes but
also exert a massive influence over educational institutions. Since they
abhor notions of hierarchy and other gradations of excellence, including moral excellence, their understanding of education is nothing
like the old Greek paideia or the Christian cultivation of the various
faculties of the soul, such as intellect, will, imagination, memory, the
heart, and so on. Their very thin idea of education is something like
the transfer of data from a supplier (formerly a teacher) to a consumer
(formerly a student).11 Their opposition to notions of excellence is
so intense they go to war against the idea that some families might
be more excellent than others or some forms of human relationships
are better than others or some literature or music is superior to other
books or other scores. According to these granola-eating left liberals,
the greatest sin is to use the human intellect to make value judgments.
What they despise is the kind of thoroughly Christian mentality
that Jacques Maritain displayed when he wrote that Christian habits,
the discipline of the will, and so on are “metaphysical letters patent
of nobility.” For these types, there can be no nobility, not even of
the spirit. Not only do such new left ideologues control most of the
humanities departments in the world’s elite universities; they are also
highly influential in departments of education, family and women’s
affairs, health, and child welfare.
In their account of the intellectual history of Western civilization, Milbank and Pabst also observe that liberals cannot pretend
to have invented values such as freedom, equality, toleration, individual rights, constitutionalism, mixed and balanced government,
the rule of law, limits on both state and market power, fair deten-

11

The author is aware that different Catholic theologians recognize different
faculties of the human soul and some want to argue that the heart is merely
an organ that pumps blood around the body and should not be included in a
list of human faculties. The author, however, disagrees with this judgment and
follows in the tradition of scholars such as John Henry Newman, Dietrich von
Hildebrand, and Joseph Ratzinger, for whom the human heart is very much a
concept of theological (not merely biological) significance.
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tion, fair trial, right to defense, habeas corpus, good treatment of the
convicted, trial by peers, need of proof for guilt, and requirements
for restitution, reparation, and rehabilitation of offenders.12 These
ideas, they emphasize, are all of Greco-Roman or Germanic law or
Christian provenance. They suggest that one can have all of them
without any recourse to liberal ideology, which is a claim worth
serious consideration.
Milbank and Pabst do acknowledge the argument, often presented
by American neoconservatives, that nineteenth-century French
liberalism a la de Tocqueville and Benjamin Constant is not as bad
as British liberalism a la Hobbes and Locke, but they also argue that
even this more benign form of liberalism gives priority to rights over
duties and priority to the individual over the community, and thus is
part of the noxious inheritance of late-medieval Scholasticism. Not
only did late Scholasticism fuel the intellectual rebellion that became
known as Protestantism, thus destroying the unity of Western Christendom and its sacramental cosmology; the late medieval notions of
univocity (the denial of inherently different qualitative degrees within
being), nominalism (the denial of the reality of universal modes of
existence), and voluntarism (the insistence that divine and then
created will is the primary determinant of reality) also reverberated
through the field of politics. In the intellectual history recounted by
several scholars from the Radical Orthodoxy stable (not just Milbank
and Pabst), this trilogy of intellectual falls creates the slippery slope
that ends with the liberalism of Rawls and other theorists who deny
the existence of any substantive good. Rawls famously said that, if a
man wants to spend his life counting blades of grass, then that is the
good life for him and no one can stand on the outside of this decision
and judge it to be a complete waste of the gift of life.
While thus acknowledging that some instantiations of liberal
political theory may be better or worse than others, Milbank and
Pabst nonetheless argue that, whatever good the more benign forms
of liberalism may permit, this good is never stable. In particular, it is
vulnerable to Hobbesian arguments about the freedom of the individual being best served by strong, centralized governments.13 The better
of the nineteenth-century’s theories expect “tradition” (understood
in something like a Burkean sense as long-standing social mores) to
do the social cohesion work previously undertaken by the Christian
12
13

Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 29.
Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 32–34.
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and Neoplatonic metaphysics of participation that was destroyed
by the trio of univocity, nominalism, and voluntarism, mentioned
above. However, Burkean notions of tradition have proven to be
powerless before the waves of Nietzschean deconstruction.
Milbank and Pabst also dismiss the idea that the Renaissance
republican tradition, with its secularist conception of virtue, is a serious contender as a solution to the crisis of contemporary liberalism.
They argue that the price of the secularization of virtue in Machiavelli is a “re-primitivisation and re-paganisation which returns virtue
understood as virtù to its etymological root of male aggressive prowess” and renders modern virtue “proximate to liberal norms, whose
formal negativity is predicated on the latent violence of an assumed
initial lack of consensus.”14 In summary:
Under the aegis of liberalism, the realm of society is corroded
from two opposite directions. On the one hand, everything
human is declared only natural—we are a bunch of greedy apes
with bigger brains. On the other hand, everything human is
declared entirely artificial, just stuff that we have made up such
as the social contract, which reflects nothing other than the
arbitrary whims of human volition and can be simply undone
by other acts of will. In this way, liberalism tends to make the
human vanish in two directions: first, archaically in the face
of the tide of pre-human nature by appealing to the lowest
instincts such as greed, fearfulness and enmity; second, futuristically, in favour of a “post-human” project that can hopefully subordinate human egotism and the unpredictabilities
of desire to a cybernetic future that will augment the liberal
“peace of a sort” into an absolute bio-politics. In this way, the
consummation of liberalism’s inevitable utilitarian inversion
ushers in a phase of history that is both post-democratic and
post-humanist.15
Milbank and Pabst conclude that the history of the century
(1914–2014) suggests that, “if the state does not acknowledge the
need to be guided by higher principles than power or wealth, then
one of two consequences will ensure: either the state invests politics and the economy with quasi-sacred significance, like Fascism,
14
15

Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 37.
Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 58.
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Communism and Neo-liberalism, or else the state ends up adopting
a political religion with theocratic tendencies.”16 Like MacIntyre,
William Cavanaugh, David L. Schindler, and several other leading
Catholic scholars, Milbank and Pabst declare the liberal tradition to
be flawed in its foundations. They therefore seek to re-weave the fabric
of the social tapestry that got torn apart by the successive waves of
univocity, nominalism, and voluntarism and to rescue what remains
intact of the tapestry and give it a new lease on life with some strong
arguments in favor of its superiority over liberal social forms.17
Their concrete proposals include directly electing mayors, affirming local government and regional identities, reviving the old guildhalls, reforming the Privy Council so that it is not merely another
arm of the executive branch of government, reforming the House
of Lords so that it becomes a House of a diverse array of social and
professional elites, reforming the House of Commons by getting rid
of the simple “first past the post” principle, allowing for some of the
larger electorates to return more than one Member of Parliament and
bringing in other changes to break up the monopoly of the two-party
system, and finally, establishing more Royal Colleges for a wider
range of vocations.
In relation to the reform of the House of Lords, it is recommended
that hereditary peers be included, not dropped, and that their role
should include a special brief for ecological guardianship. Precisely
how this might look in practice is not developed, but one thinks of
Prince Charles’s many projects to promote the economic viability
of the British villages and to protect the countryside from being
destroyed by philistine property developers. It is probably this kind
of work that Milbank and Pabst have in mind. There has always been
a close association between the National Trust and the aristocracy.
Both try to preserve the natural and cultural treasures of the United
Kingdom.
Milbank and Pabst want to retain the aristocratic element in British society and to affirm all the good community work that many of
the aristocratic families already do, especially in the fields of ecological and cultural treasure preservation. Above all, they want the
Royal Family to have a significant political role and not be reduced
16
17

Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 234.
The “re-weaving the tapestry” metaphor is taken from the title of Hans Boersma’s book Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011).
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to a “mere ceremonial apex upon a capitalist spectacle.” They argue
that missing from contemporary liberal democracies are “genuine
elites”—“virtuous inspirers and architectonic leaders that act honourably and lead by example in all sectors of society.”18 They further
argue that there needs to be a symbolization of the pursuit of the
good at a hierarchical summit.19 The monarchy serves this purpose,
which they describe in the following terms:
The personal role of the monarch exceeds the impersonal forces
of the nation, the state or the market, reminding us at the top
that the entire edifice of structure and process is in the end a
human worker, a human emergence, dependent on an amalgam of private human decisions. For this reason, monarchy can
today symbolically and actively uphold the sanctity of labour
(human beings are first and foremost works), land (the shared
commons) and life (the dignity of the human person). The
House of Windsor has to some degree already, and commendably, started to take on this international role—even if it could
be greatly extended, to potential global benefit, potentially
somewhat reviving at a supranational level the lapsed (but arguably theo-politically indispensable) role of the Holy Roman
Emperor in the older polity of Christendom.20
The pair even go so far as to refer to the “Christological mediation” of the British monarch, who is “answerable to a higher authority than simply his own private inner conscience.”21 As Roger Trigg
explains:
In England, the Cross on top of the Crown, coupled with the
symbolism of the Coronation service, demonstrate the fact
that temporal power is not the final source of authority, but is
itself answerable to a higher Power. The Queen, personifying
all government in this land, is subject to principles and standards that are not the making of herself or her ministers. All
are under the ultimate judgment of the God who created all.
Denying that is to make something else, whether the interest of
18
19
20
21
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the stronger, or the fickle will of the people, an untrustworthy
guide.22
Such an exhortation in favor of monarchical forms of government
is rarely to be found in contemporary Anglophone Catholic literature, with the notable exception of the works of the English Dominican Aidan Nichols. As Robert P. Kraynak has noted, according to
thinkers like Nichols, “the deficiency of democratic and republican
forms is the inability to sustain the high culture and civic piety that
monarchical and aristocratic forms once cultivated as a matter of
course and that helped to sustain a Christian civilisation with loftier
aspirations than bourgeois culture.”23 Nonetheless, perhaps because of
the lingering Fenian influence in Anglophone Catholicism, the natural Catholic affinity for some form of Christian monarchy is far less
pronounced in Anglophone publications than it is in French publications. A contemporary joke is that the French College in Rome is
politically divided between the Légitimistes and Orléanistes, the absolute monarchists and the constitutional monarchists. Republicans,
apparently, are nowhere to be found. Although it is hard to believe
that a few Gaullists have not slipped through the net somewhere,
the caricature is not hard to believe, since the Republican tradition in France is so notoriously anti-Catholic. The memory of the
Republican suppression of the Vendée, not merely the Republican
defeat of the Royal and Catholic Army, but the wholesale genocide
of the civilian population, women and babies included, runs so deep
in French Catholic culture that it makes a “baptism” of the French
revolution very difficult. The English historian Simon Schama has
described the suppression of the Vendée in 1793 as the first example of genocide in modern history. Even the largest buckets of holy
water are inadequate to heal the lesion caused by the murder of some
hundreds of thousands of people, including the so-called Republican
“baptisms,” or deliberate drowning, in the Loire River. Famously,
the only uniform of those peasants and aristocrats who together
formed the Royal and Catholic Army was a cloth badge in the shape
of the Sacred Heart sewn into their shirts.
Recently, the memory of the heroism of the Vendeans was recalled
by Cardinal Robert Sarah, whose home is the former French colony
22
23

Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 219.
Robert P. Kraynak, Christian Faith and Modern Democracy: God and Politics in a
Fallen World (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 233.
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of Guinea. He described advocates of abortion and population control
in Africa as being like the Republican revolutionaries who massacred
the people of the Vendée, and he rhetorically asked: “Who will dare
to confront the modern persecutors of the Church? Who will have
the courage to rise up without any weapons other than the rosary
and the Sacred Heart, to face the columns of death of our time?” He
further described the “columns of death” as relativism, indifferentism, and contempt for God. He said that the contemporary revolutionaries, like the revolutionary Republicans, want to exterminate
families. He predicted that Africa, like the Vendée, will resist, and
he exhorted the French people to do the same. He concluded with
the statement: “My friends, the blood of martyrs flows in your veins,
be faithful to it! We are all spiritually sons of la Vendée martyrs.”24
While Milbank, Pabst, and Nichols agree about many aspects of
the argument in favor of the British monarchy, where they differ is
over the significance of the Church of England. Quite simply, Nichols, on the one hand, and Milbank and Pabst, on the other, offer two
different meta-narratives about the place of the Church of England
in British history. According to Milbank and Pabst, “after Henry
VIII’s break with Rome, the Church of England eventually sought to
preserve the balance between priesthood and monarchy that reflects
the patristic and medieval emphasis on Christ’s priestly and kingly
authority.”25 According to Nichols:
With the Protestant Reformation—first Henrician-Edwardine
and then, after the intermezzo of Mary’s reign, Elizabethan—
the English Crown (in Parliament or not as the case may be)
destroyed the relative autonomy of sacerdotium in its relation to
regnum. In Western Christendom that autonomy had always
been guaranteed in principle, however fluctuating it was in
practice, by the “de-centredness” of the national Church which
recognised the chief seat of ecclesial authority in the See of
Rome. . . . The English reformation was, then, the action of
the Crown in establishing control over the Church, far more
fully than in the Middle Ages and with a systematic repudia24

25

Nick Hallet, “Cardinal Sarah: The New Revolutionaries are Trying to Destroy
the Christian Family,” The Catholic Herald, August 16, 2017, catholicherald.
co.uk/news/2017/08/16/cardinal-sarah-the-new-revolutionaries-are-tryingto-destroy-the-christian-family/.
Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 233.
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tion of the claims of the See of Rome. Within this broadish
framework much that was Catholic could survive, but in a form
vulnerable to theological fashion, political events and—in the
setting of mass democracy in the twentieth century—cultural
trends.26
Milbank and Pabst defend the established position of the Church
of England and argue that the political role of the established Church
is “neither to sanctify the state nor to supplant the government as
elected and representative, but, rather, to ‘inform’ public institutions
in the direction of both individual virtue and public honour, without which democracy cannot function or thrive.”27 The Church of
England is also praised for sustaining a parish system that helps to
structure and coordinate local life in diverse ways.28 Other faiths,
they suggest, can come to occupy the same space in a “quasi-established fashion.” Specific mention is made of the Catholic, Jewish, and
Islamic faiths in this context.
Notwithstanding this offer to somehow “share the space,” we are
still left with an Act of Settlement that precludes the monarch from
ever being a Catholic and we have the Church of England occupying
property that was taken from the Catholic Church in a civil war that
destroyed almost all the Benedictine monasteries. The monastic treasure and property was plundered by the crown and often distributed
to socially significant families who would support Henry’s cause.
The parish structure that currently offers tea and sympathy across the
villages of the Kingdom pre-dates the Church of England. England,
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were Catholic territories for
some 1,000 years before Henry VIII had a fight with Pope Clement
VII about divorce and remarriage. Bishop John Fisher, the Lord High
Chancellor Sir Thomas More, and some of the best and brightest men
and women of the Kingdom went to the gallows because they refused
to accept Henry’s new morality.
In one place, Milbank and Pabst observe that “to do something
wrong is also to do something badly, to botch things up in a way that
is bound sooner or later (even if decades or centuries later) to fail,

26

27
28

Aidan Nichols, The Realm: An Unfashionable Essay on the Conversion of England
(Oxford, UK: Family Publications, 2007), 51–52.
Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 232.
Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 238.
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because vices are hard to sustain and ultimately self-defeating.”29 The
fundamental difference of Milbank and Pabst from Catholic monarchists is that the Catholics believe that Henry VIII and those social
climbers who supported him got something wrong and botched things
up and so his project is bound to fail, even if centuries later, because, as
they say, vices are hard to sustain and ultimately self-defeating.
The “vice” at the root of the Church of England is its weak moral
theology, beginning with Henry’s attack on the indissolubility of
marriage. It is precisely the area of sexual morality and the theological
significance of gender distinctions that today is most definitive of the
difference between the Catholic Church and the Church of England.
Edmund Adamus has gone so far as to argue that it is precisely because
of decisions made by Church of England leaders in the twentieth
century in these fields that London has become, in his judgment, “the
epicentre of the culture of death.” Adamus traces the contemporary
culture of death to the decision of the Lambeth Conference of 1930
to permit contraception, thereby accepting a severance of the procreative from the unitive dimensions of human sexuality. In his “The
Body’s Grace” lecture, Dr. Rowan Williams, the former Archbishop
of Canterbury, acknowledged that this decision about contraception
had, as a matter of logic, opened the gate to an acceptance of homosexuality, though he does not see this as a problem.
In the context of a discussion about liberalism’s failure to recognize
the existence of the human soul, Milbank and Pabst refer to Belgium’s
euthanasia laws as an instance of the triumph of what St. John Paul II
called a “culture of death.”30 A whole doctoral thesis could be written
on the subject of whether London or Leuven (home of the “Catholic” University where a philosophy professor was recently sacked for
presenting a prolife argument to his students) is the epicentre of the
culture of death.31 Indeed, one may well conclude that London is the
epicenter of the culture of death in its Protestant form and Leuven
in its Catholic form. Whatever of that issue, the fact is that, from
a Catholic perspective, Milbank’s and Pabst’s anti-liberalism is not
quite anti-liberal enough, since they have missed drilling down to
one of the major roots of Britain’s social decay—the botched jobs of
the Henrician and Elizabethan “root canal fillings” as they manifest
29
30
31

Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 6.
Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 274.
Tom Heneghan, “Catholic University in Belgium Sacks Lecturer Who Called
Abortion ‘the Murder of an Innocent Person,’” The Tablet, April 10, 2017.
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themselves today in the almost complete failure of the Church of
England’s leaders to offer any kind of intellectual and spiritual resistance to the sexual revolution of the 1960s. As many have noted,
today it is neither the Anglo-Catholics nor the Calvinists who dominate the Church of England, but the liberal party. Thomas Howard
in his “Lead Kindly Light” interview summed up the situation in the
following terms:
The Anglicanism/Episcopalianism of today differs violently
from the Church (of England) into which I was received in
l960. Back then, the worst feature of the Anglican communion was sheer Modernism, which had taken over 100% of the
seminaries in the U.S., and 19% of the parishes and priests. But
now, that Modernism (springing as it did from l9th century
German biblical criticism whose axiom was that miracles don’t
occur, hence the Bible is a tissue of fairy tales) has reached its
tentacles into the moral realm, and, whereas most Episcopal
clergy back then would have vaguely espoused the general
tradition of Western decency, now they are loud and vicious in
their insistence on re-drawing the moral map of the universe.
It is an inevitable development, but nonetheless shocking and
dismaying.32
In the final analysis, The Politics of Virtue may well become as
influential as MacIntyre’s After Virtue or Rawls’s Theory of Justice. It is
certainly a powerful critique of the crisis of modern liberalism and
the economic and cultural orders it has engendered. In these most
unaristocratic times, when the liberal tradition now takes the form of
a totalitarian intolerance of almost all standards of excellence, Queen
Elizabeth II is a quietly dignified counter-force. She is also arguably
the most widely respected world leader today. She has taken her coronation oath to defend the Christian faith in the countries of her realm
seriously, even though, by Catholic standards, she has not been as
heroic as King Baudouin of Belgium, who abdicated for a day rather
than have his name attached to pro-abortion legislation, or Archduke
Henri of Luxembourg, who refused to have his name associated with
pro-euthanasia legislation. Queen Elizabeth II is often held up as
the quintessential example of a servant leader, since she has devoted
32
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decades of her life to self-sacrificial public service. British Commonwealth Catholics who care about the Christian fabric of their nations
should be natural supporters of the monarchy. However, this does not
mean that they have to give up on the project of restoring the “old
faith” in the British Isles. Rather, they should rally behind the cause
of the Servant of God Fr. Ignatius Spencer, great-great-great uncle
of Diana, the Princess of Wales, and pray for the conversion of the
British crown.
There is a story that, when Bishop Ullathorne of Birmingham,
who was a lineal descendent of St. Thomas More, had a meeting with
St. John Vianney in 1854, Vianney said to Ullathorne: “Monseigneur,
I believe that the Church in England will one day be restored to her
former glory.” If only the British Catholic bishops were to believe
this and pray for it and encourage Her Majesty’s Catholic subjects to
do the same! Until such time, however, scholars like Milbank and
Pabst and their Catholic sympathizers need to work together against
all those forces who seek to snuff out every spark of grace and nobility
N&V
in what Shakespeare called “the sceptred isle.”

